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Information Value of Credit Ratings in Asia Ex-Japan 
Markets 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the information value of credit ratings by exploring the 
relationship between ratings and security price. Unlike previous studies, we concentrate 
on the major markets ex-Japan in Asia.  
We begin with an investigation of rating reclassification as well as credit watch 
placement events by three leading international rating agencies. We show that markets 
with differing level of sophistication behave differently. Specifically, South Korea and 
Hong Kong are found to respond in a similar manner. Indonesia shows possible sign of 
information leakage. In the cases of Malaysia and Thailand, significant and positive 
equity price responses exist for upgrades, suggesting that upgrades are news-worthy in 
Asian market. However, we find that global raters fail to provide Taiwan market with 
new tradable information. 
 Further, we split the rating changes into anticipated and unanticipated events to 
account for the likely differential effects caused by market anticipation. We find evidence 
that market anticipation neutralizes the announcement effect.  
We also examine whether the Asian financial crisis exerts impact on the magnitude of 
market reaction associated with rating news. For most markets in our analysis, the market 
reaction resulting from downgrades is muted during the crisis period. 
We also investigate whether global raters and local raters impact market differently. 
The results are mixed. Local raters in Taiwan and South Korea seem more influential 
than their global peers, whereas it is not the case in Thailand. 
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 In general, we find that there is information value in the announcements of rating 
revision and credit watch. The six Asian markets have heterogeneous responses to these 
announcements. Overall, our findings may help fund managers to better understand the 
announcement effects, and regulators to justify the incorporation of external credit ratings 
into the capital adequacy requirements. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Credit rating agencies have played an important role for decades in financial markets. 
The major responsibility of rating agencies is to convey their opinions regarding the 
default risks of certain issuers or market instruments by assigning credit ratings. The 
ratings they provide are widely used by various market participants. More specifically, 
lenders can rely on ratings in decision-making without having to engage themselves in 
the costly and time-consuming information gathering process. For borrowers, ratings can 
widen their access to funding through dissemination of their credit quality information to 
investors. Portfolio managers also use credit ratings in portfolio management. Ratings 
from certain reliable agencies are also used by regulator. For example, the SEC proposed 
that public companies inform investors what are the ratings of their securities as given by 
the agencies. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) establishes capital 
adequacy requirements based on ratings provided by external credit rating agencies. 
The performance of rating agencies has been the subject of intense debate in the past 
few years. Rating agencies have been accused of failing to provide reliable and timely 
ratings. It could be a conflict of interest due to a business relationship with the company 
management. Accusations of lagged reaction to information have intensified especially 
after several emerging market financial crises. Rating agencies are criticized for passively 
reacting to the crisis instead of being able to predict the crisis. The controversy over 
rating agencies leads to a copious amount of research being carried out on the 
information value of ratings. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, there would be a 
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market reaction associated with rating revision announcement if the event incorporates 
valuable and price-relevant information. 
A large number of studies have examined the effect of rating changes on stock prices. 
The majority deal with studying the US market, whereas few research studies have been 
done on investigating the Asian markets. The paucity of research arises from the 
embedded characteristics of Asian economies. In contrast to the US market, the Asian 
markets are relatively small and less well-regulated. In particular, the weaker is the 
market regulation and the greater the market segmentation, the more likely it is to 
observe information leakage and insider trading prior to any news event. 
However, due to the ongoing development and increasing importance of the Asian 
markets, more research should be conducted to see if the results obtained from mature 
markets such as US are similar. Emerging markets are characterized by information 
asymmetry and low transparency. There are limited channels for companies to 
disseminate information to the investing public. Credit rating thus serves as one of the 
few available signals to convey relevant information in smaller Asian markets. 
Consequently, the information released by rating agencies might be more news-worthy in 
these markets. Also, in light of the important regulatory role of rating in some mature 
markets, this study might be more meaningful for smaller Asian markets where the 
regulation may be weaker compared with US market. 
This study also seeks to examine the influence of global credit rating agencies relative 
to local agencies. Against the background of a rapidly growing emerging economy, the 
demand for domestic ratings has been gaining greater importance over time. The global 
rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s generally charge much higher fees 
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for rating services than local ones given their greater specialized skills and experience in 
rendering rating service. Therefore, from the financial perspective, the local rater is in a 
stronger position to service the emerging market by allocating its resources to rate small 
issuers that may be of less interest to the global raters. In addition, the domestic rater is 
perceived to have a wide and easy access to local information, thus facilitating a better 
understanding and insights of local issuers’ credit worthiness. By contrast, the US 
headquartered international rating agencies may react more slowly due to the inherent 
geographic disadvantages. If that is the case, the rating announcement by domestic raters 
might be more informative relative to their international counterparts.  
However, given the short history of rating record, lack of transparency, the local 
agencies may receive little recognition from investors. This argument is consistent with 
an Asian development bank paper which surveys a pool of investors on their opinions of 
local raters. It is reported that 45% of investors surveyed said the local raters were 
absolutely not timely at all. If this market perception dominates, the market might be 
insensitive to the local rating announcement. Another criticism of local agencies is that 
the local rating agencies are more likely to apply weaker standards to domestic firms, 
which is referred to a home bias. To get a more comprehensive understanding of how 
information is reflected in emerging market, exploring the difference between local and 
global news announcement is of critical importance. 
    
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The object of this study is to examine the impact of credit rating changes on common 
stock returns. In particular, we seek to answer the following questions:  
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1. Do rating agencies have superior information and analytical skills and hence can 
their rating revisions influence excess equity returns?  
2. Do the response patterns to rating events vary across different markets? 
3. Does the placement to credit watch list have information value? 
4. Do the unanticipated events carry more information than the anticipated ones? 
5. Does the Asian crisis have an influence on the market reaction to news 
announcement? 
6. Is there any difference between the market reactions to rating events announced by 
international agencies relative to those announced by local agencies? 
7. What kind of role does rating play in the regulatory framework of emerging market? 
 
1.3 Organization of the study 
This paper proceeds as follows: 
Chapter Two reviews the existing literature and provides the theoretical background 
of this study. 
Chapter Three describes the data used and explain how we select the sample in detail. 
In addition, the methodology employed in empirical analysis is discussed. 
Chapter Four presents the empirical results with corresponding explanations and 
related discussions. 
Chapter Five outlines the main findings of this empirical work and points out the 
limitations and suggests additional avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
A large body of literature has investigated the informativeness of credit ratings by 
working with the rating-related events. Those events cover various perspectives regarding 
credit rating. For instance, Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) analyze the impact of 
assignment of new rating on UK capital market and find no significant abnormal return 
associated with it. An empirical work by Kliger and Sarig (2000) suggests that rating 
information is price-relevant and valuable, citing evidence that bond price adjusts to 
information following Moody’s refinement of its rating system. More recently, 
Aintablian and Mora (2005) find no market response around Moody’s announcement of 
eliminating the sovereign ceiling on company rating. These studies are relatively rare 
since the events covered happen less frequently. Consequently, more and more works 
focus on the upgrade and downgrade events. 
 
2.1 Impact of rating changes on security price 
The argument that there is a linkage between rating revision and security price has its 
rationale embedded in the belief that rating agencies are capable of gathering, processing 
and then conveying important private information to the market. Within the theoretical 
framework of market efficiency, the information content of rating can be tested by means 
of examining the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of rating revision. 
    The initial focus of the literature in this area is the effect of rating changes on bond 
prices. Those works report conflicting findings: Weinstein(1977) find little bond price 
reaction to the bond rating changes announcement, whereas other studies, such as Katz 
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(1974), Grierand Katz (1976), Ingram, Brooks and Copeland (1983), Wansley and 
Clauretie (1985) and Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) do find significant bond 
price reaction. These differences in results can be attributed largely to the issues of 
methodology, sample periods and the data frequency (monthly, weekly or daily). 
Researches began to concentrate on the stock price reaction to bond ratings as well. 
Numerous studies have investigated the information value of credit rating changes by 
measuring the abnormal stock returns around the announcement.(Griffin and Sanvicente 
1982, Goh and Ederington 1993, 1998, Dichev and Piotroski, 2001) Although there is 
some variation in results across studies, there is evidence that an asymmetry exists in 
stock price reactions to credit rating downgrades and upgrades. Specifically, a downgrade 
announcement is followed by a significant negative accumulative abnormal stock return, 
whereas an upgrade announcement is followed by an insignificant positive accumulative 
abnormal stock return.  
  This puzzling empirical regularity is explained from the aspect of the incentives 
of the companies and the rating agencies (Goh and Ederington (1998)). It is argued that 
companies are more likely to release the favorable information instead of the unfavorable 
information. On the other hand, the rating agencies have the strong incentive to spend 
more resources in detecting deterioration in credit quality rather than improvements due 
to the higher reputational cost of failing to detect credit problems. Those biases make the 
downgrade information more newsworthy in the market and thus the market reaction to 
the downgrade is stronger.  
There are also studies looking at the price activity prior to and following the rating 
changes. While many studies find statistically significant announcement period abnormal 
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returns, the magnitude of announcement effects is often quite small compared with the 
movements in stock prices that occur prior to the rating announcements. For example, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find that downgrades (upgrades) tend to occur following 
periods of negative (positive) abnormal returns. This finding suggests that the market 
participants have already partially anticipated the rating changes, or in other words, the 
market impounds information much more quickly and efficiently than rating agencies do. 
Using a comprehensive sample covering period of 1970 to 1997, Dichev and Pioktroski 
(2001) find substantial and persistent negative abnormal returns over a long period 
following downgrades. In the case of upgrades, little or no supportive evidence is found.  
2.2 Cross-section variation in the market reaction to rating changes 
A number of studies have addressed the cross-sectional differences in the market 
reaction to downgrades. Hsueh and Liu (1992) propose that market anticipation plays a 
role in the magnitude of market reaction. More generally, market reaction to rating 
changes depends on whether new and valuable information is conveyed to the market. 
The rating revision has informational content only if the announcement communicates 
new and value-relevant information to market. If the information is already anticipated by 
investors, the market may not respond to the news. They use equity ownership dispersion 
and interest rate volatility as measure of the quantity of information available to control 
for the market anticipation of a rating change announcement. They find no market 
response to rating changes for larger firms and significant price movements for smaller 
firms with less information available in the market. Creighton, Gower and Richards 
(2004) also provide evidence for differential market response related to firm size.  
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Jorion and Zhang (2005) suggest that initial value of the rating is an important but 
ignored factor in the explanation of cross-sectional difference. They find a much stronger 
stock price movement for rating changes starting from a lower initial rating. Supporting 
evidence for this argument can be found in the study by Goh and Ederington (1999).  
The magnitude of market response also depends on whether the rating change crosses 
the investment to speculative-grade border. Institutional investors are prohibited from 
holding the issues of investment grade, leading to a larger price movement when the 
border is crossed. This “investment-grade” effect is discussed in Jorion and Zhang (2005).  
 
2.3 The informativeness of credit watch procedure 
   Aside from enormous empirical evidence concerning the upgrades and downgrades, 
the credit watch procedure, an issue little studied, has stirred interest in this related stream 
of research. On the theoretical side, Boot, Millbourn and Schmeits (2006) analyze the 
economic role played by credit rating agencies through the credit watch procedures in the 
financial markets. In their proposed model, the credit watch procedure helps to establish 
an implicit contractual relationship between the agencies and the rated firms. The 
mechanism works as follows. Suppose the agency observes potential deterioration in the 
firm’s credit quality, it will ask the firm to deal with the unfavorable situation and place 
the firm on the watch list. The rated firm can choose whether or not to undertake 
recovery effort (observable to the rating agency but not by the market) after being put on 
negative credit watch list. If the firm succeeds in restoring the credit quality, the rating 
may get reconfirmed. Otherwise, it will be downgraded ultimately. The subsequent 
downgrade enables the market to realize that the downgraded firm did not undertake 
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recovery effort or failed in improving the credit quality. In contrast, for the downgrade in 
absence of a prior credit watch, the market only learns about the failure of the recovery 
effort over time, thus the price impact takes more time to materialize. Given that, they 
draw an empirical prediction: a rating change after a credit watch procedure is more 
likely to be informative than a rating change without an early warning. In addition, they 
propose that this mechanism only works in the case of downgrade because the rating 
agency has less incentive to put a company on the positive credit watch list. More 
importantly, their model is based on the conditionality of investment decisions on the 
credit rating, an institutional feature prevailing in the US market. 
In related empirical work, Hand, Richard and Leftwich (1992) examine the security 
price reactions associated with the announcement of additions to credit watch list, more 
specifically to the negative watch list and positive watch list. When dealing with all the 
credit watch placements, they document virtually no significant non-zero abnormal return 
to those events. They then split all the observations into “expected” and “unexpected” 
subsamples using a price-impact model. No statistically significant impact on price is 
observed for the unexpected subsample of negative credit watch. However, in the case of 
positive watch placement, the market appears to be non-responsive.  
 
2.4 The impact of information events in emerging market 
Another related branch of literature is one that studies the impact of information 
events in emerging market. As noted earlier, the distinct features characterizing emerging 
markets could pose problems for event study, complicating the task of identifying the 
information value of various events. An examination of 32 firm-specific news 
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announcements in Mexico between 1994 and 1996 by Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson 
and Kehr (2000) shows no abnormal jump in stock returns around the announcement date. 
The authors then provide 5 possible candidates for the explanation of such an interesting 
finding. They are small sample size, inefficient market, efficient market but no 
information value inherent in those events, full anticipation by the market and 
unrestricted insider trading. Further, they provide evidence favoring the last one.  They 
conclude that the insider trading causes the prices to fully incorporate the information 
before its public release, thus turning an event into a non-event.  
As regards the information content of credit rating in developing and small economies, 
there appears to be little research addressing this issue. Different from many US studies 
that concentrate on company rating, most emerging market studies are primarily 
concerned with the effect of sovereign rating. The only study investigating the 
informativeness of rating at firm level in emerging markets is by Richards and 
Deddouche (1999). Surprisingly, the market is either insensitive to rating changes or 
responsive in an opposite direction from what is expected. However, the surprising 
results in this paper may arise from a non-robust empirical methodology. More broadly, 
the combination of 15 markets with differing level of sophistication could lead to 
misleading results. Using weekly data instead of daily data is not ideal since using a 
shorter observation interval is more effective in exploring daily trends or security price 
reactions on specific event days. In addition, further investigation on all industries is 
preferable to the concentration on only the banking industry. Therefore, there is scope for 
a more comprehensive analysis on this issue. 
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2.5 Comparison of the influence of rating agencies 
A very limited number of studies have previously examined the differential impact of 
rating agencies. Kish, Karen and Olson document no evidence that market values one 
agency over the other by comparing the ratings from Moody’s and S&P. Further, Shin 
and Moore (2003) compare credit ratings assigned to Japanese firms by two leading U.S. 
rating agencies and two leading Japanese agencies. Their findings suggest that the ratings 
by the U.S. agencies are systematically lower than those assigned by Japanese raters. A 
follow-up study by Li, Shin and Moore (2006) conclude that global agencies are more 
influential than local raters for downgrades in Japanese context. Also, they find the 
ratings by the two prominent rating agencies are homogenous. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Event definition 
We investigate the information value of credit ratings by examining the market 
reaction to rating revision events around the announcement date. For this analysis, we 
follow the existing related empirical works to analyze the upgrades and downgrades 
announcement.  
However, it would be too limiting to centers purely on the upgrades and downgrades 
since doing so omits the potential differential effect between rating changes preceded by 
a watch and those that were not preceded by a watch. We extend our analysis to include 
partitioning our rating changes into anticipated and unanticipated ones to test their 
possible different impact. An anticipated event refers to a change where the rated 
company was put on the credit watch list prior to the announcement date, with a direction 
consistent with the actual subsequent changes. Credit watch is a valuable predictor of 
issuer’s creditworthiness. By placing firms on the credit watch list, the rating agencies 
disseminate the information that an improvement or deterioration is likely to take place in 
the short term to market participants. Suppose the firm is ultimately downgraded or 
upgraded as the credit watch list indicates, the market reaction to the rating revision 
announcement might be muted since the news has already been anticipated by the public 
through the credit watch procedures. Therefore, we expect that the unanticipated events 
carry more information than the anticipated ones. 
Aside from the actual rating changes, we also consider the credit watch events. The 
credit watch event deals with the announcement of additions to the credit watch list. 
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Specifically, “negative watch events” and “positive watch events” are defined based on 
the direction of the likely change indicated by the agency. 
The exact definitions and specific examples of various rating events to be employed 
in the context of this study are outlined in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 about here 
 
3.2 Data  
3.21 Data source 
      The data required for the analysis include the credit revision events and time 
series stock price data of several major Asian markets. The credit rating change data are 
collected from the Bloomberg database. The information provided by Bloomberg consist 
of the announcement date, rating type, rating agency, current rating, last rating and 
industry type of the rated issuers. The ratings selected for analysis are from Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, the three most recognized rating agencies in the world. 
The raw sample collected covers changes in credit ratings between January 1997 and 
December 2005. Six Asian major markets excluding Japan are selected: Indonesia, Hong 
Kong, South Korea，Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. In addition to the rating 
information from the international raters, we also examine the rating revision 
announcement by local raters to obtain a more comprehensive analysis. Those data are 
obtained from Bloomberg. Aside from the actual rating changes information, Bloomberg 
also provides the credit watch indicators, which forms a part of our analysis.  
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As for the stock return of the rated companies, we use the daily closing price from the 
Datastream. These are supplemented with information from Bloomberg as well as from 
the local stock exchange. To measure the abnormal return, we also collect the daily local 
stock indices data denominated in local currencies of the 6 markets from Datastream. The 
sample of credit events is reduced substantially because of the data problems.  
 
3.22 Data summary 
 
Figure 3.1 about here 
 
  Figure 3.1 reports relative frequency of upgrades and downgrades in credit ratings 
by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P in the sample period covering January 1997 to December 
2005. As can be seen, relative to Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, Fitch has a smaller 
proportion of rating revision announcements in all the markets covered. The prevalence 
of Moody’s and S&P’s rating revision announcements differs across markets. The rating 
changes announced by Moody’s constitute the majority of the sample events in Thailand, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Malaysia. For the remaining two markets, S&P dominates.  
 
Figure 3.2 about here 
 
The annual evolution and frequency of upgrades and downgrades are presented in 
figure 3.2. Two apparent features can be seen from this figure. First, it is characterized by 
the clustering of downgrade events in 1997 and 1998, a period experiencing the Asian 
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financial crisis. During the crisis period, the percentage of downgrades was excessively 
high for most markets in the sample except Taiwan. In the case of Taiwan, the clustering 
of downgrade is not as obvious as the other 5 markets. This is mainly because Taiwan 
was relatively unaffected by the crisis. South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, countries 
most affected by the crisis, experienced a larger number of downgrades compared to 
other markets in the crisis period.Those findings indicate that the rating agencies behave 
pro-cyclically: upgrading countries in good times and downgrading them in bad times, 
which is discussed in Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999). 
Another important feature of figure 3.2 is that the proportion of upgrades is 
substantially greater than that of downgrades in the non-crisis period for all the covered 
markets.  
 
3.23 Sample selection 
To avoid a loss of power in our tests resulting from other events with potentially 
confounding effect on stock prices, we eliminate the observation if another news 
announcement concerning earnings and mergers occurred during the event window of 41 
days. There are also some cases where the rating is changed consecutively by multiple 
agencies. The temporal clustering of rating revisions for the same company might be 
potentially problematic for empirical analysis since it may induce a biased estimate of 
stock price movement around a particular event. For the two consecutive events within a 
10 day window, we include the event if both are upgrades or both are downgrades. In this 
case, the earlier not the later event is included. The resulting sample used for analysis is 
summarized in table 3.2. 
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 Table 3.2 about here 
 
3.3 Event study methodology 
The information content of rating is examined by means of an event study. The length 
of the event window and the estimation window are illustrated below: 
 
 
 t=-120                                                              t=-20                t=0                   t=20 
                    Estimation window                                     Event window 
 
The choice of the event window is based on an attempt to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of how does the market respond to rating-related events. With the event 
announcement day specified as day 0, a period of 20 days on both sides of this day are 
chosen. The event window is split into three sub-windows. To capture the likely 
information leakage, we define the period (-20,-1) as the pre-announcement period. 
Although the information from Bloomberg includes the announcement day of each event, 
we cannot identify the exact time of announcement and thus can not determine whether 
the announcement occurs during the trading hours. Therefore, we choose a two-day 
period (0, 1) as the announcement window to account for this uncertainty. In addition, we 
also examine another period (2, 20) following the announcement window to take the 
possible lagged reaction into consideration. 
This paper uses daily stock price data to compute two different measures of returns 
for the rated companies. The first measure is based on the market model as follows: 
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                                                                     (1)it i i mt itR Rα β ε= + +  
where  
                        itR  = return on firm i for day t 
                       mtR = return on market index for day t 
                       itε  = error for day t. 
The coefficients are estimated for a given firm over a 100-day estimation window starting 
120 days prior to the announced event and ending 20 days before the event day. The 
abnormal return is defined as the difference between actual returns and the returns 
predicted by the above model.  
Another measure computes the excess return version of the market model: 
                                                  (2)( )it ft i mt ft itR R R Rβ ε= + − +  
where the risk free rate ftR  is collected from Datastream. The results of this model are 
not materially different from the other model, and hence we only report the results of 
equation 1. 
Next, the average abnormal return, AAR, is calculated by averaging the n events for a 
specific event day t: 
               
N
                                                           (3)
i=1
1
t itAAR AR
N
= ∑  
 
Then, the AARs are aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for a certain 
period 
 2
1, 2
1
                                                  (4)
t
t t t
t t
CAAR AAR
=
= ∑ 
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The test statistic for the significance of AAR equals to the ratio of AAR to its 
standard deviation. The standard deviation is estimated by the data obtained within the 
estimation window.  
Further, the standard deviation of cumulative average abnormal return is given by 
standard deviation of AAR multiplied by the square root of the number of days in the 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
20
2
120
                                                               (5)
( )
1( ) ( )                            (6)
100
t
t
t t
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s AAR
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical analysis by examining the information value of 
credit rating in four different aspects. In each case, the results for average abnormal 
returns on five specific event days are presented. Besides, cumulative average abnormal 
returns over the pre-announcement, announcement and post-announcement windows are 
reported respectively. The discussion in this chapter centers on the price movement over 
the 3 windows in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the price adjustment. 
 
4.1 Is there any market reaction to actual rating changes and credit watch related 
events? 
The first section examines whether stock returns are significantly influenced by actual 
rating changes announcement and by credit watch placement announcement. The 
inclusion of credit watch event is based on an expectation that the placement of a firm on 
the credit watch list may convey some new price-relevant information to the market 
because the credit watch list serves as an early warning system for likely rating changes 
in the short run. The results are reported by market in table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 about here 
 
Hong Kong and South Korea display a uniform response pattern to the events 
investigated. More specifically, price adjustment surrounding downgrades are 
significantly negative, reinforcing the evidence of information value of downgrades 
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observed in other markets. For upgrades, there is little evidence of significant price 
movement. It is apparent that the two markets do not treat upgrades as an informational 
event. These findings suggest that South Korea and Hong Kong appear to behave in a 
manner consistent with other mature markets. For the credit watch events, only the 
negative watch placement has an impact on market and the magnitude of reaction is 
smaller than that of downgrades for both markets, indicating that a possibility of being 
downgraded is less informative than an actual downgrade. This evidence is consistent 
with prior research (Hand, Richard and Leftwich (1992)). As regards the difference 
between the two markets, the price adjustment observed in South Korea is more drastic 
than that in Hong Kong in terms of magnitude and significance level. 
In the case of Indonesia, there is no market reaction associated with upgrades and 
credit watch events. As regards downgrades, there appears to be a full information 
leakage which translates into a strong negative cumulative average abnormal return of     
-15.809 over the pre-announcement window. The information is found to be incorporated 
into prices prior to downgrade announcements, suggesting a degree of inefficiency in the 
Indonesia market.  
As shown in table 4.1, the Malaysia market reacts to both negative watch placement 
and downgrades announcements. An interesting finding is that a significant lagged price 
adjustment appears for upgrades over the post-announcement window, indicating that 
upgrade constitutes an informational event in the context of Malaysia. This detected 
response is contrary to the usual result found in previous literature that upgrades do not 
have an impact on market.  
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For the Thailand market, it appears that the good news announcements contain new 
information that surprises investors. More specifically, positive watch placement 
contributes to a highly significant cumulative average abnormal return of 2.660 over the 
two-day announcement window. In addition, positive price adjustment is observed for 
upgrades announcement. In terms of bad news, the market apparently does not treat 
downgrades and negative watch placement as informational events, thus no evident 
market reaction being detected. It is obvious that the Thailand market behaves in a totally 
different way from its more developed counterparties. The informative upgrades may 
arise from the limited access to information in developing economies, an explanation can 
be provided to account for the similar market reaction to upgrades observed in Malaysia. 
For the lack of reaction to bad news, it is difficult to identify the exact reason. As 
discussed by Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson and Kehr (2000), five possibilities are 
suggested. It is possible that the market is too inefficient to reflect new information. 
Alternatively, there might be no price-relevant information in downgrades. Or the market 
has fully anticipated the event, thus no abnormal jumps in stock return are being detected 
around announcement period. Also, unrestricted insider trading, which can cause prices 
to fully incorporate the information prior to public announcement, may contribute to the 
observed insensitivity. Aside from those possibilities, another likely reason is that this 
result is only unique in this specific period which includes the Asian crisis. In our case, 
the first reason mentioned above is unlikely because there is evidence of response to 
upgrades in Thailand. In terms of other possibilities, it is too premature to conclude 
which one is the most relevant candidate and further discussion will follow. 
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As regards Taiwan, the results are to a great extent surprising. Neither upgrades nor 
downgrades have an effect on security prices. The discussions regarding Thailand can be 
applied to the case of Taiwan. No sign of information leakage is observed, indicating that 
insider trading seems unlikely in this case. In the subsequent sections, we’ll seek to 
explore why Taiwan behaves in such an interesting way. 
Based on findings in this section, it is apparent that a variety of different reactions 
exist across the Asian markets. The different market behaviors observed are in accord 
with prior expectation that markets with differing level of sophistication may exhibit 
unique patterns.  
 
4.2 Do the unanticipated events carry more information than the anticipated ones? 
Having determined that the six Asian markets differ in reaction to rating related 
events, we now attempt to reveal more about the nature of rating changes. This section 
hence extends the main results by segmenting the rating changes into anticipated and 
unanticipated ones according to whether the rerated firm was placed on credit watch list 
with the same direction as the announced rating change before the announcement. Table 
4.2 provides the results from the six investigated markets.  
 
Table 4.2 about here 
 
Four markets present a similar pattern that the unanticipated events have a more 
drastic market impact. More specifically, in the case of Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Malaysia, the information value of downgrades observed in section 4.1 almost entirely 
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comes from the unanticipated downgrades. For the anticipated downgrades, no 
informational content is found, as shown by the insignificant market reaction over the 
event window. Also, the differential impact of anticipated and unanticipated downgrades 
holds true for the upgrades in Malaysia. While the anticipated upgrades appear to have an 
impact on the announcement date in Thailand, the impact of unanticipated upgrades is 
stronger over the two-day announcement window with a higher significance level. 
Looking at the downgrades in Thailand, there is still no abnormal jump in stock return 
surrounding downgrades even after we segment them based on market anticipation. It 
suggests that market anticipation mentioned in section 4.1 would not be responsible for 
the insensitivity detected earlier in the case of downgrades. 
Indonesia differs from the above markets. Based on the findings in section 4.1, there 
is a strong information leakage associated with downgrades during the twenty-day pre-
announcement period. After the partition in this section, the unanticipated downgrades 
sustain the same pattern as the overall sample, given its more important weight in the 
overall sample. The anticipated downgrade, on the other hand, is perceived to have a 
strong effect over the announcement window. Unlike other markets, the difference 
between anticipated and unanticipated events lies in the response time instead of the 
magnitude. This difference appears to be driven by the differing incentives to possible 
leakage of information. In particular, for the unanticipated downgrades, insiders tend to 
trade on relevant information because it is more likely to be a shock to market, leading to 
a negative CAR of -18.423 preceding the announcement. For anticipated downgrades, 
however, the same incentives may not exist because the information regarding the 
downgrades was already conveyed to market when the firms in question were added to 
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the negative credit watch list. In addition, the significant announcement effect of 
anticipated downgrades contrasts with what was observed in other markets, suggesting 
that although investors may receive prior warning of downgrades in the form of credit 
watch placement, there is still uncertainty regarding the timing and magnitude of the 
possible downgrades. This uncertainty is reflected in the negatively significant market 
reaction, which is suggestive of a component of surprise in the news.  
As with Taiwan, the market is still insensitive to any kind of rating revisions when the 
market anticipation is taken into consideration. Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that 
the market anticipation may not explain the curious findings of Taiwan in section 4.1.  
 
4.3 Does the Asian crisis have an impact on the market reaction to news 
announcements? 
In addition to the differences in the response induced by market anticipation, the 
market reaction may differ in other ways. The selected period in previous discussion 
incorporates the Asian financial crisis which leads to a spike in downgrades. As discussed 
in Reisen (2002), the rating agencies were accused for reacting to events rather than 
anticipating them in the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. This opinion is in line with the 
argument of Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) that the performance of rating agencies is 
poor during the Asian crisis. The discussion with regard to agency performance in 
emerging markets is mainly concerned with the sovereign rating. We thus expect that the 
poor performance may hold true for ratings at company level. Given that, in this section, 
we examine the different response patterns to various market conditions by splitting the 
sample into crisis period and non-crisis period. The crisis period is defined as July, 1997 
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to December, 1998. Since almost all the upgrades cluster in the non-crisis period, this 
analysis is only carried out for downgrades. Sample size and empirical results are 
presented in table 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 about here 
 
Table 4.4 about here 
 
Panel A in table 4.4 looks at Thailand, Hong Kong and Indonesia. Among the three 
markets, the first two markets share some common features. In particular, no effect is 
encountered for downgrades in crisis period, whereas strong impact exists for those 
during the non-crisis period. This phenomenon can be attributed to the likely excess 
pessimism due to the financial crisis in which investors tend to have a negative 
anticipation towards the financial status of firms in the market. This psychological factor 
may turn a piece of negative news into a non-surprise. In this way, downgrades in a bad 
time would not have any impact on market. Now we can safely conclude that the 
interesting finding for downgrades in Thailand detected in section 4.1 can be attributed to 
the time period chosen. The result of overall sample is neutralized by the lack of response 
in the crisis period. 
The Indonesia market appears to behave in a slightly different way. The negative 
effect of downgrades during non-crisis period is much stronger than that of the other two 
markets. While there is no announcement effect from downgrades in crisis period, the 
large negative reaction over pre-announcement window makes clear that market reacts 
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more quickly. This evidence is consistent with the so-called procyclical nature of rating 
discussed by Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999). An alternative explanation for it is that the 
information leakage through insider trading causes the market to fully incorporate 
relevant information into prices before publicly announced. Taken together, the results in 
panel A suggest that the rating changes during non-crisis period exert a much stronger 
announcement effect on market.  
Further evidence from South Korea and Taiwan can be found in panel B. The result 
of South Korea contrasts with that of markets in panel A. While negative reaction is 
significant at 10% on day 1 in non-crisis period, the announcement effect over (0, 1) is 
much smaller than that of the crisis period. Such a finding could be related to the 
characteristics of South Korea market. As one of the leading economies in the Asia-
Pacific region, South Korea has a relatively sound market condition which enjoys more 
investor confidence. In this case, it could be true that even if the market is under crisis, 
the investors may believe that there is a high probability of the economy recovering in the 
near future. In absence of the sagging investor confidence, there is still some element of 
surprise in the downgrades announcement. With regards to the downgrades in the non-
crisis period, the muted effect may be due to a small sample size of 10.  
Looking at the result of Taiwan, no significant movement of asset price is observed in 
crisis period and the results practically do not change during the non-crisis time. When 
investigating the rating revisions of Taiwan in the overall sample period in section 4.1, 
similar results are found. The non-response remains after dividing the overall sample into 
two parts, suggesting that the sample period chosen is not responsible for the lack of 
market reaction in Taiwan.  
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In a practical sense, there is something to get excited about. Referring to the third 
column in panel B, while the CARs over the announcement and post-announcement 
window are not statistically significant, the difference between the two figures is 
economically significant. An opportunity for profit might arise supposing the investors 
buy stocks of downgraded firms during the announcement period and then hold them for 
one month (about 20 trading days). We found similar evidence during the crisis period of 
Hong Kong, as shown by a difference of about 5.8% in column 2 of panel A. 
 
4.4 Is there any difference between the market reaction to rating events announced 
by international and those by local agencies? 
This section aims to measure the relative importance of rating agencies in the 
domestic market by testing whether the information released by renowned international 
rating agencies is more reliable and informative than that by smaller and less experienced 
local raters. The dataset utilizes the rating history of three local rating agencies: KIS 
(Korea Investor Services), TRC (Taiwan Rating Corporation) and TRIS (Thailand Rating 
Information Services). The exclusion of the other three markets discussed earlier is due to 
the lack of historical data of local ratings in Bloomberg. Another caveat results from the 
relatively short history of the included local raters. In particular, the respective sample 
periods for the three agencies are: 1997-2005 (KIS), 2000-2005 (TRC) and 2002-2005 
(TRIS). In order to make the results more comparable and meaningful, the sample 
periods for global raters are confined to be consistent with their respective local 
counterparts. In addition, caution and prudence will be exercised in comparing the 
different markets due to the differing sample period across markets.  
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 Table 4.5 about here
 
To get a sense of the distinct rating activities across agencies, table 4.5 outlines the 
coverage frequency of global and local raters using the raw sample. For all the markets, 
local agencies rate the largest number of firms, 93, 27 and 237 for TRC, TRIS and KIS 
respectively. However, among the rated firms, only a small number of firms are covered 
by both local and global agencies. This common feature can be attributed to the different 
client groups they have been serving. Generally, firms with large capitalization are more 
willing to request rating service from international agencies since their objective is to step 
into the global market and attract more international investors. The financially 
disadvantaged small issuers, in contrast, tend to choose local agencies who charge less 
prohibitive fees.  Looking at the number of events announced by local and global raters, 
South Korea and Thailand share a resemblance that the majority of the upgrades and 
downgrades are by global raters and local raters respectively. This can be explained by 
the fact that large firms rated by global raters are more likely to be upgraded due to their 
relatively sound financial status, whereas there is a higher possibility for small and 
medium enterprises (SME) to be downgraded because they are in more volatile and 
vulnerable financial position. Among the three markets, South Korea has the largest 
number of rating revision events and the largest coverage of firms rated. This is possibly 
due to its relatively well-established and sophisticated financial market. This pattern still 
remains after its longer sample period has been taken into consideration.                                                           
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The remaining sample after dropping events with insufficient data and those 
contaminated by other price-relevant news is summarized in table 4.6. Next, table 4.7 
provides the event study results for the selected period.  
 
Table 4.6 about here 
 
Table 4.7 about here 
 
For South Korea in panel A, there is no big difference in the global upgrades and 
local upgrades. As with downgrades by global raters, a statistically significant negative 
abnormal return of -2.14738 is detected. Compared to the price behavior of rated firms by 
global raters over the event period, the results for local downgrades show different 
characteristics. There is some indication that most downgrades are foreseen by the market. 
A significant negative CAR is observed over the (-20, -1) window. While the strong pre-
announcement impact suggests a market anticipation, the negative CAR of -1.52522 over 
the announcement window makes clear that there is still a large element of surprise in the 
news announcement. In addition, a prolonged market reaction is observed over the 
subsequent period (2, 20). Therefore, the South Korea market, on average, reacts strongly 
to local downgrades, a supporting evidence for the higher influence of local agency.  
In the case of Taiwan, upgrades, regardless of being rated by global agencies or by 
local ones, are statistically insignificant during the event window. The downgrades, 
however, exhibit different characteristics. There is no evidence that the market is 
responsive to downgrades by global raters, consistent with the earlier finding using an 
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alternative period from 1997-2005. (see panel B in table 4.1). Surprisingly, stock price 
responds significantly to downgrades by local agency in the expected direction. This 
result contrasts greatly with that of global agencies, providing evidence that local agency 
provides better quality information than its international counterparts at least in the 
Taiwan context.   
As noted in the previous discussion regarding the non-response of Taiwan market to 
both upgrades and downgrades by global raters, six possibilities are potentially relevant: 
full market anticipation, insider trading, sample period chosen, small sample, inefficient 
market and value-irrelevant rating information. The fourth explanation fails to hold 
because the sample size of informative local downgrades is only slightly larger than that 
of global downgrades. Similarly, if Taiwan market is informationaly inefficient, we 
should not observe any significant price impact for the local downgrades. Given that the 
first three alternative possibilities have been ruled out in the earlier section, we, therefore, 
can conclude that the investors in Taiwan do not value the information as much from 
global rating agencies. In other words, there is little information value inherent in global 
rating changes. 
Results in panel C of table 4.7 are for rated firms in Thailand. As can be seen, the 
news by global raters has a CAR significant at 1% for the two-day announcement 
window, a result consistent with the finding in section 4.1 where a longer sample period 
is involved. It appears that the upgrades by global agencies contain new information that 
surprises investors and the market interprets it as good news. Nonetheless, this fails to 
hold true for upgrades by local agency and no significant effect is produced during the 
event period. There appears to be a greater average price impact of global rating relative 
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to local rating. In the case of downgrades, comparison is not available because all the 
downgrades by local raters happened before 2002. The result of local news shows no 
market reaction associated with downgrade announcements.  
Having investigated the above three markets individually, we now seek to explore the 
reason why the relative importance of local raters vary across markets. To gain further 
insight into the three local rating agencies, we present their characteristics in table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 about here 
 
 In terms of available services provided by local raters, TRIS has been offering the 
most extensive services to its clients, followed by KIS. In contrast, TRC do not expand its 
services as its peers do. Instead, it chooses to concentrate exclusively on the rating 
services. Looking at the various shareholding structures outlined in panel B, the 
“International CRA-Domestic CRA” link-ups seem to be a common practice. For 
instance, Moody has a 50% stake in KIS and S&P holds a 50% equity stake in TRC. 
Nevertheless, TRIS is an exception with no joint partnership with international CRAs. 
The different background shown above may contribute to explaining the fairly 
divergent market reaction patterns observed. Among the analyzed local agencies, only 
TRIS has no impact on security price. It may be true that the possible political 
dependence, as shown by a government ownership of 19%, may deplete the credibility of 
TRIS. The stock price, therefore, is not responsive due to the market perception of 
political intervention. Aside from that, a more likely candidate might be the lack of joint 
partnership with global raters. The market may anticipate that the local raters are able to 
 33
receive technical support and skill transfer from their partner and thus enhance their 
credibility. This raises the possibility that the reponsiveness observed in the case of TRC 
and KIS may be partly the result of international rating agencies’ participation in 
ownership.  
Another interesting finding in this section is the strong differential effects of 
downgrades detected for global versus local agencies (TRC). It is possible that the 
difference arises from TRC’s concentration on rating service, as indicated by panel A in 
table 4.8.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
 
  
 5.1 Summary of the results     
    Credit ratings are quite prevalent in financial markets and a large body of literature 
has documented that the security price will be significantly affected when rating agencies 
revise the ratings they issued. However, there has been a lack of studies on Asian markets. 
Credit rating has been regarded as an effective channel to reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry. Hence the role played by rating agencies is more meaningful to 
smaller markets where transparency is weaker. Given that, this study aims to discuss the 
information value of credit ratings in smaller Asian markets excluding Japan. This issue 
is investigated by measuring the pre-announcement and post-announcement as well as the 
contemporaneous responses of six Asian financial markets to rating related events.  
This study begins with an examination of market response to rating related events 
announced by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. The evidences from the six Asian markets are 
mixed, suggesting the manner in which markets react to credit rating differs across 
markets and relates to the distinct characteristics of specific markets. In particular, Hong 
Kong and South Korea, more advanced markets are found to behave in a similar way to 
their developed counterparties: immediate reaction to bad news but no response to good 
news. Strong evidence of information leakage is observed for Indonesia, indicating a 
degree of inefficiency. The results from the other three markets: Malaysia, Thailand and 
Taiwan are quite interesting. Malaysia and Thailand markets respond to upgrades. This 
finding can be attributed to the lesser availability of opportunities by firms to 
communicate good news in the two markets. Thailand, however, shows non-response to 
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downgrades. More surprisingly and interestingly, there is no impact associated with any 
kind of rating events announced by the international rating agencies in Taiwan. 
Next, the main results from above are further investigated by the partition of rating 
changes. The segmentation is based on the differing market anticipation incorporated in 
rating revisions. The results suggest that, on average, the unanticipated events carry more 
information value than the anticipated ones. In the case of Taiwan, no difference is 
detected because the market remains unresponsive after the partition of the overall 
sample.  
We also compare the impact of downgrades during the crisis periods with those 
during the non-crisis period to account for the potential impact of Asian financial crisis. 
Among the five examined markets, most of them behave in a similar manner. For Hong 
Kong, Thailand and Indonesia, the announcement effect of downgrades in the non-crisis 
period is much stronger than that in the crisis period. In the case of South Korea, the 
downgrades in the crisis period appear to be more informative. Taiwan is still insensitive 
in market response during any sub-sample.  
Finally, different samples from the local agencies are examined to measure the 
relative influence of local versus global raters. In this analysis, three markets are 
investigated. South Korea and Taiwan seem to be more sensitive to local raters. The 
differential impact of local and global rater is extremely apparent in Taiwan, indicating 
that the local rater is much more credible in the domestic market. For the Thailand market, 
the global rater is more influential in terms of both market coverage and market impact. 
To sum up, all the findings in this study show that generally the credit ratings in 
emerging markets do contain new information. However, the market reaction to the 
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information differs in term of market characteristics, rating agencies, markets conditions 
and investors anticipation. 
 
5.2 Limitation of the study 
There are some limitations with respect to the analysis and data that may affect the 
accuracy of the results. 
1. The sample size for the covered markets is small due to the difficulty in the 
availability of data going farther back in time. This may bring bias into research. Using 
small sample size may increase the possibility that the final sample just happen to behave 
in the observed manner. The small number of events in this study might be a caveat, we 
therefore exercise prudence and caution when interpreting the empirical results to ensure 
a more reliable conclusion. 
 2. The sample of credit events is reduced substantially because of the data problems. 
Many rated companies do not issue stocks and the data of some listed companies is not 
available due to inactive trading.  
 
5.3 Direction for future research 
There are several additional avenues that could be explored, all of which would help 
in understanding this issue better. 
An extension to this study would be to consider the cases of listing abroad. The 
globalization of financial market has catalyzed the growing migration of financing 
activities abroad and the number of companies seeking a foreign listing has increased 
over the last few decades. This is particularly the case in emerging markets where the 
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minority shareholder protection is weaker and hence the firms have incentives to signal 
the willingness to protect minority shareholder right through cross listing. Whether rating 
revisions to foreign listed firms from international rating agencies can trigger stronger 
reaction in the foreign market is worth investigating. Whether rating changes to local 
listed firms by domestic rating agencies have more influence on local market is another 
interesting issue. Further studies can be conducted to explore these possibilities. 
 
5.4 Implication of the study 
This study adds to the literature on the effects of credit ratings on financial markets. 
On the theoretical side, we present supporting evidence for the informational content of 
credit ratings in emerging markets. More importantly, we demonstrate how the 
information is reflected in the covered markets. On the practical side, our findings 
provide some insight for portfolio management. The market reaction displayed in this 
study can help portfolio managers have a better understanding of the price behavior in 
response to changing ratings and thus facilitate their investment decisions. Last but not 
least, the evidence that ratings in emerging markets do contain information has some 
implications from the policy perspective. The regulators in emerging markets can rely on 
ratings to monitor the banking industry, justifying the incorporation of external credit 
ratings into the capital adequacy requirements proposed by Basel Committee. 
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Table 3.1: Events definition 
 
Event type Definition Examples 
Upgrade The announcement of a 
positive change in rating 
BBB → AAA/AAA *+/AAA*-  
BBB *+ → AAA/AAA *+/AAA*- 
Downgrade The announcement of a 
negative change in rating 
AAA→ BBB/ BBB*+/ BBB*- 
AAA*- →BBB/ BBB*+/ BBB*- 
Anticipated  
upgrade 
The announcement of an  
upgrade preceded by a  
positive watch indicator 
BBB *+ → AAA/AAA *+/AAA*- 
Unanticipated 
 upgrade 
The announcement of an  
upgrade not preceded by  
a prior watch indicator 
BBB → AAA/AAA *+/AAA*- 
Anticipated  
downgrade 
The announcement of an 
downgrade preceded by  
a negative watch indicator 
AAA*- → BBB/ BBB*+/ BBB*- 
Unanticipated 
 downgrade 
The announcement of a  
downgrade not preceded  
by a prior watch indicator 
AAA → BBB/ BBB*+/ BBB*- 
Positive watch The announcement of  
additions to the positive 
watch list 
AAA→ AAA *+ 
Negative watch The announcement of  
additions to the negative 
watch list 
AAA→ AAA *- 
 
Note:  1. *+ : positive credit watch indicator;  *- : negative credit watch indicator; Cases            
               involving developing credit watch (e.g. BBB*) are excluded 
           2. There are only a few cases in which the change direction is inconsistent with the      
               credit watch  indicators. These are omitted. (e.g. BBB*- → AAA/AAA*+/AAA*-,  
               AAA*+ →BBB/ BBB*+/ BBB*-) 
           3. There are only a few cases where firms are removed from the credit watch list  
               without subsequent  rating change. (e.g. AAA*+ → AAA , AAA*- → AAA)   
               These are omitted. 
           4. There are only a few cases involving changes in the status on credit watch list,  
               but without changes in rating classification (e.g. AAA*+ → AAA*- , AAA*- →   
              AAA*+). These are not considered. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of final rating sample (1997-2005) 
 
 Upgrades Downgrades Credit watch 
 Anticipated 
upgrade 
Unanticipated 
upgrade 
 
Total
Anticipated 
downgrade 
Unanticipated 
downgrade 
 
Total 
Negative 
watch 
Positive 
watch 
Hong 
Kong  
 
11 
 
24 
 
35 
 
12 
 
15 
 
27 
 
24 
 
12 
Indonesia 10 38 48 20 34 54 8 12 
Malaysia 19 27 46 1 28 29 7 22 
Taiwan 1 20 21 5 25 25 5 4 
Thailand 19 59 69 8 59 67 7 24 
South 
Korea 
 
30 
 
3 
 
33 
 
15 
 
40 
 
55 
 
11 
 
29 
 
Note:  Number of negative/positive watch exceeds number of anticipated downgrade/upgrade in 
some markets because some negative/positive watch firms subsequently became excluded from 
the sample. Some also remained as negative/positive watch at end of sample period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Market reaction to actual rating changes and credit watch events (1997-2005) 
Panel A: Good news 
Average abnormal returns 
Hong Kong South Korea Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Taiwan 
Days 
relative  
to event Positive 
watch 
Upgrade Positive 
watch 
Upgrade Positive 
watch 
Upgrade Positive 
watch 
Upgrade Positive 
watch 
Upgrade Positive 
watch 
Upgrade 
-2 -0.593 0.149 0.655 -0.109 -4.619 -0.108 0.112 -0.187 0.038 0.300 -0.718 0.748 
-1 -0.515 0.358 -0.145 -0.202 0.802 -0.699 0.550 * 0.241 0.659 0.069 0.716 0.151 
0 0.246 0.111 0.644 0.465 -0.021 0.601 -0.151 0.266 2.289 *** 0.721 ** -1.088 -0.425 
1 0.069 0.087 0.369 0.697 0.900 -0.187 0.432 0.056 0.371 0.2361 -0.729 0.273 
2 0.531 -0.042 -0.389 0.204 -1.780 -0.091 -0.116 -0.180 -0.509 0.1867 -0.0002 -0.217 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 -2.276 0.354 -0.082 -0.532 1.780 -3.122 1.120 0.790 4.280 -1.348 5.934 0.410 
0 to 1 0.315 0.199 1.013 1.163 0.879 0.414 0.281 0.322 2.660 *** 0.957 ** -1.817 -0.152 
2 to 20 -0.38 0.056 -1.757 -2.028 -5.955 -2.644 0.032 2.053 ** -1.4967 -0.633 -6.631 -3.014 
Panel B: Bad news 
Average abnormal returns 
Hong Kong South Korea Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Taiwan 
Days 
relative  
to event Negative 
watch 
Downgrade Negative 
watch 
Downgrade Negative 
watch 
Downgrade Negative 
watch 
Downgrade Negative 
watch 
Downgrade Negative 
watch 
Downgrade 
-2 -0.203 -0.285 -3.93 *** 0.779 0.108 -1.740 ** -0.048 -0.235 1.158 -0.359 2.870 -0.151 
-1 0.383 0.899 -1.818* -1.067 ** -2.284 -2.644 *** 0.851 -0.512 1.233 0.146 0.394 0.324 
0 -0.098 0.163 -2.437 ** -0.662 1.013 0.373 -0.744 -0.910 * 2.160 -0.423 -0.201 -0.197 
1 -1.292 ** -1.693 *** -0.16 -1.486 *** -1.140 0.197 -0.783 -0.491 -0.980 -0.169 -1.192 0.154 
2 -1.196 ** 0.062 -1.843 * -0.362 -1.701 -0.853 -0.767 -0.070 -0.916 -0.246 0.085 -0.570 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 -3.357 4.276 -2.602 0.406 -7.282 -15.809*** 0.760 1.998 3.845 2.204 -1.363 -2.255 
0 to 1 -1.390 * -1.53 ** -2.597* -2.147*** -0.128 0.570 -1.527 * -1.401 * 1.179 -0.592 -1.392 -0.042 
2 to 20 -0.736 2.519 5.218 2.868 10.549 1.700 -1.3295 2.286 5.596 0.152 2.031 1.699 
           Notes: 1.Since the excess return results are almost identical to the market model results, only the latter model is reported. 
         2. The sample size is listed in table 3.2. 
         3. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level 
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Table 4.2 Market reaction to anticipated and unanticipated rating changes 
Panel A: Anticipated events 
Average abnormal returns 
Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Taiwan 
Days 
relative  
to event Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
-2 0.384 0.044 -0.056 0.668 -0.051 0.950 0.593 0.418 0.271 1.638 0.281 0.417 
-1 0.051 0.256 -0.204 1.062 0.213 0.281 0.402 -0.164 -1.817 1.254 1.084 -1.531 
0 -0.181 0.986 0.539 1.540 0.395 0.011 1.192 * 0.609 3.142 -3.083 *** -0.037 0.456 
1 -0.082 -1.948 ** 0.706 -0.924 0.036 0.303 0.0009 0.580 -1.770 -3.485 *** -0.166 -2.206 
2 -0.026 -0.225 0.029 0.907 -0.336 -0.789 0.090 -0.270 -0.443 -1.355 0.678 -0.031 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 0.655 1.335 -1.479 -0.911 1.743 -1.731 -0.695 3.241 -6.895 -2.078 -0.639 -4.010 
0 to 1 -0.263 -0.962 1.245 0.616 0.431 0.314 1.193 1.189 1.3725 -6.567 *** -0.202 -1.750 
2 to 20 1.382 -2.804 -3.073 5.487 1.366 4.490 0.427 -4.551 -5.151 1.571 3.240 0.274 
Panel B: Unanticipated events 
Average abnormal returns 
Hong Kong South Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Taiwan 
Days 
relative  
to event Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
-2 0.421 -0.549 -0.640 0.658 -0.282 -0.277 0.186 -0.464 -0.207 -2.512 *** 0.771 -0.293 
-1 0.117 0.613 -0.174 -1.68 ** 0.261 -0.540 -0.058 0.188 -0.405 -2.664 *** 0.104 0.788 
0 -0.193 -0.496 -0.270 -1.465** 0.174 -0.943 * 0.542 * -0.563 -0.068 0.566 -0.445 -0.360 
1 -0.097 -1.489** 0.608 -2.975 *** 0.070 -0.617 0.325 -0.271 0.230 0.384 0.295 0.744 
2 -0.044 0.291 1.955 -1.567 ** -0.070 -0.045 0.222 -0.242 0.001 0.342 -0.262 -0.705 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 1.228 4.829 8.940 -0.495 0.119 2.131 -1.596 2.063 -2.129 -18.423 *** 0.463 -1.816 
0 to 1 -0.289 -1.985** 0.338 -4.4405 *** 0.244 -1.560 ** 0.867 ** -0.834 0.162 0.950 -0.150 0.384 
2 to 20 1.412 4.777 8.422 1.4485 2.537 ** 1.279 -1.035 0.790 -1.984 -1.455 -3.327 2.056 
Notes: 1. Since the excess return results are almost identical to the market model results, only the latter model is reported. 
           2. The sample size is listed in table 3.2 
           3. The sample period is 1997-2005 
           4. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.3:  Sample size of downgrades in crisis versus non-crisis period 
 Thailand Hong Kong Indonesia South Korea Taiwan 
Crisis period 51 14 44 45 9 
Non-crisis period 16 13 10 10 16 
 Notes:1. The crisis period refers to July 2, 1997 to December 31, 1998. 
           2. The rating changes are by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
           3. All the downgrades in Malaysia are announced in the crisis period, thus this market is 
not included in this section 
           4. Since almost all the upgrades were announced in the non-crisis period, only downgrades 
are investigated. 
 
Table 4.4: The impact of downgrades in crisis period and non-crisis period 
Panel A: Hong Kong, Thailand and Indonesia 
Average abnormal returns 
Hong Kong Thailand Indonesia Days 
relative  
to event 
Crisis 
period 
Non-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Non-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Non-crisis 
period 
-2 -1.03286 0.52022 -0.52152 0.102082 -0.68601 -2.43719* 
-1 0.988395 0.80210 -0.18665 0.541607 -1.3971 -0.61684 
0 0.28511 0.03093 0.03478 -1.03845 0.88473 -8.0458** 
1 -1.47616 -1.926 *** -0.02901 -1.23014* 0.06547 -5.87398*** 
2 -0.049103 0.18090 -0.30902 0.076857 -0.06101 -1.19658 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 5.7603 2.6774 2.3673 2.33899 -13.904***  -6.7784 
0 to 1 -1.19105 -1.8950 ** 0.00577 -2.26859 ** 0.950200 -13.9198*** 
2 to 20 4.615898 0.25999 -2.86540 0.408246 -1.289299 4.60461 
 
Panel B: South Korea and Taiwan 
South Korea Taiwan Days relative  
to event Crisis period Non-crisis period Crisis period Non-crisis period 
-2 0.4789456 2.126784 -0.1472289 -0.15257 
-1 -1.507427 *** 0.917559 1.54112 -0.35995 
0 -1.144089 *** 1.510087 0.5195423 -0.59929 
1 -1.155841 *** -2.971 * 1.619222 -0.67007 
2 -0.9026876 * 2.070228 -1.629059 0.026085 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 0.976268 -2.15911 0.6031949 -3.863 
0 to 1 -2.29993 *** -1.46091 2.1387643 -1.26937 
2 to 20 2.2599716 5.605767 0.0257177 2.640717 
Notes: 1.The crisis period refers to July 2, 1997 to December 31, 1998. 
           2. The rating changes are by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
           3. All the downgrades in Malaysia are announced in the crisis period, thus this market is 
not included in this section. 
           4. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 4.5  Coverage frequency of global and local rater (raw sample) 
 
 Taiwan Thailand South Korea 
Number of upgrades announced by global rater 54 30.51% 86 64.66% 336 53.00% 
Number of upgrades announced by local rater 123 69.49% 47 35.34% 298 47.00% 
Total 177 100.00% 133 100.00% 634 100.00%
Number of downgrades announced by global 
rater 
41 51.90% 3 20.00% 248 42.54% 
Number of downgrades announced by local rater 38 48.10% 12 80.00% 335 57.46% 
Total 95 100.00% 15 100.00% 583 100.00%
Number of firms covered by global rater 51 35.42% 23 46.00% 70 22.80% 
Number of firms covered by local rater 93 64.58% 27 54.00% 237 77.20% 
Total 144 100.00% 50 100.00% 307 100.00%
Number of firms covered by both global and local 
rater 
5 N.A 2 N.A 10 N.A 
 
Note: The sample periods for comparison are: 1997-2005 (South Korea), 2000-2005 (Taiwan) 
and 2002-2005 (Thailand). 
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              Table 4.6: Summary Statistics of final rating sample  
 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
Markets Global raters Local rater Global raters Local rater
Taiwan 16 54 25 27 
Thailand 50 24 0 7 
South Korea 33 152 55 170 
 
Notes: 1.The sample periods for comparison are: 1997-2005 (South Korea), 2000-2005 (Taiwan) 
and 2002-2005 (Thailand).  
          2. The global raters refer to Moody’s, S&P and Fitch for all markets. The respective local 
raters are: KIS (South Korea), TRC (Taiwan) and TRIS (Thailand). 
          3. In the case of Thailand, no downgrade is announced in the clean sample by global raters 
for the period 2002-2005. 
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Table 4.7    A comparison of market reaction to rating changes announced by local raters 
and global raters 
Panel A: South Korea  
Average     abnormal        returns 
Upgrades Downgrades Days relative to 
event Global raters Local raters Global raters Local raters 
-2 -0.1088 -0.17563 0.778553 -0.6915134 *** 
-1 -0.2015 0.058211 -1.06652 ** -0.1966708 
0 0.46535 0.087466 -0.66151 -0.3448268 
1 0.69746 0.048482 -1.48587 *** -1.241045 *** 
2 0.20387 -0.05639 -0.36216 0.3099338 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 -0.5318 0.603431 0.406199 -4.4447652 *** 
0 to 1 1.16281 0.135948 -2.14738 *** -1.5252207 *** 
2 to 20 -2.0277 -1.79404 2.868298 -4.4856167 *** 
Panel B: Taiwan  
Average     abnormal        returns 
Upgrades Downgrades Days relative to 
event Global raters Local raters Global raters Local raters 
-2 -0.15257 -0.24996 -0.15065 0.096381 
-1 -0.35995 0.347911 0.324437 0.025023 
0 -0.59929 -0.00045 -0.19651 -0.54219 
1 -0.67007 -0.35024 0.154073 -0.71991 * 
2 0.026085 0.21014 -0.56977 0.376818 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 -3.863 -1.29834 -2.25517 -2.01076 
0 to 1 -1.26937 -0.35069 -0.04244 -1.2621 ** 
2 to 20 2.640717 1.801828 1.699318 -1.61805 
Panel C: Thailand  
Average     abnormal        returns 
Upgrades Downgrades Days relative to 
event Global raters Local raters Global raters Local raters 
-2 0.256804 -0.3078 N.A -0.8847939 
-1 0.06252 0.019717 N.A -1.386015 
0 0.82356 *** 0.526949 N.A -1.292597 
1 0.216977 0.404707 N.A 0.1900476 
2 0.404821 0.211373 N.A 0.7977986 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
-20 to -1 -0.4344 -1.00395 N.A -3.646863 
0 to 1 1.040537 *** 0.931656 N.A -1.1025494 
2 to 20 0.403141 -1.84061 N.A 3.3185554 
Notes: 1.The sample periods for comparison are: 1997-2005 (South Korea), 2000-2005 (Taiwan) 
and 2002-2005 (Thailand).  
           2. The global raters refer to Moody’s, S&P and Fitch for all markets. The respective local 
raters are: KIS (South Korea), TRC (Taiwan) and TRIS (Thailand). 
          3. In the case of Thailand, no downgrade is announced in the final sample by global raters 
for the period 2002-2005. 
          4. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level 
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Table 4.8  Summary of domestic rating agencies 
 
Panel A: range of services 
Market Agency Year established Major services Additional services 
South 
Korea KIS 1985 
-Rating services 
-Advisory services 
-Training 
-Project financing 
rating 
Taiwan TRC 1997 -Rating services No additional services 
Thailand TRIS 1993 
-Rating services 
-Governance rating services 
-Performance evaluation 
services 
-Guarantor rating 
-Government rating 
 
Panel B: shareholding structures 
Current share holding Market Agency Public listed Local firms/banks Govt Intl CRA Other 
South Korea KIS 50% 0% 0% 50% 0% 
Taiwan TRC N.A N.A N.A 50% N.A 
Thailand TRIS 0% 76% 19% 0% 5% 
 
Notes: 1. Data source: ‘Development of Regional Standards for Asian Credit Rating  
              Agencies – Progress & Changes’ prepared for ADB (2005) 
           2. N.A denotes data is not available 
           3. S&P initially took a 50% ownership stake in TRC and announced that it had signed an 
agreement to raise its stake in TRC from 50% to 51% on 27 September 2005. 
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Figure 3.1: Relative Frequency of Upgrades and Downgrades in Credit Ratings by 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P in the Sample Period Covering January 1997 to December 
2005 (raw sample) 
 
Panel A: Hong Kong                                                      Panel B: Indonesia                   
                             
Fitch Moody's S&P Fitch Moody's S&P 
 
Panel C: Malaysia                                                     Panel D: Taiwan 
Fitch Moody's S&P                            Fitch Moody's S&P  
 
Panel E: Thailand                                                     Panel F: South Korea 
Fitch Moody's S&P                           Fitch Moody's S&P  
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Figure 3.2 Frequency of Upgrades and Downgrades in Credit Ratings by Fitch, 
anel A: Hong Kong 
Moody’s and S&P in the Sample Period Covering January 1997 to December 2005 
(raw sample) 
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